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1Abstract
Despite extensive research and policy initiatives to increase the technical, ﬁnancial, and
managerial capacity of small drinking water systems, there has been little research focus-
ing on understanding how consolidation can increase the overall capacity of the drinking
water industry. Consolidation of water systems may be a mechanism that increases regula-
tory compliance by removing poorly performing systems from the industry and replacing
inefﬁcient management and/or capital. The US drinking water system is highly frag-
mented, with over 50,000 Community Water Systems (CWSs), of which the vast majority
are classiﬁed as "small" by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). A discrete
choice model is employed to determine the characteristics shared by small water systems
that are acquired. On average, these acquired ﬁrms are small, have frequent drinking wa-
ter violations, are privately-owned, and purchase their water from another system. These
results suggest that consolidation may have an important role to play in increasing overall
industry compliance with the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).
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The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and it’s subsequent amendments in 1986 and 1996
are the major regulations governing the US drinking water industry. The initial SDWA es-
tablished regulations for 18 drinking water contaminants along with monitoring, reporting,
and public notice requirements. The SDWA established three broad classes of drinking
water systems, the largest of these classes, Community Water Systems (CWSs), provide
drinking water year-round to a ﬁxed customer base. The US drinking water industry is
highly fragmented; there are over 50,000 CWSs in the US, over 90 percent of which serve
fewer than 10,000 people and are classiﬁed as “small” by US Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).
This paper explores the causes of consolidation in the drinking water industry to deter-
mine if this type of institutional change can increase the overall capacity of the industry
2to comply with SDWA regulations. We examine recent mergers of Community Water Sys-
tems (CWSs) to determine the characteristics of water systems that are being acquired. Our
economic model hypothesizes that acquired systems will have lower management skill, be
small, and have relatively low costs of merger. We then estimate our model using data from
EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information Systems (SDWIS) supplemented with merger data
obtained from state primacy agencies. Our results suggest increasing that regulatory com-
pliance is, in part, driving recent consolidation activity in the industry.
Under the SDWA, water quality and monitoring standards are set at the federal level;
however, state-level primacy agencies are responsible for enforcement these regulations.
Systems that do not meet the SDWA standards are subject to ﬁnes and other penalties from
the primacy agencies.
The 1986 SDWA amendments mandated stringent water quality standards and in-
cluded many regulations that were particularly burdensome for small water systems.
Those amendments required EPA to set standards for 83 additional contaminants and
set forth technology-based standards for treating contaminants (USEPA 1999). These
standards-based regulations may have stiﬂed technical innovation and reduced incentives
for alternative means of compliance with regulations.
System performance and small water systems were particular foci of the 1996 SDWA
amendments. EPA was directed to improve the technical, managerial, and ﬁnancial (TMF)
capacity of small drinking water systems. TMF capacity building was needed to keep pace
with increasingly stringent requirements for drinking water quality. The challenge was es-
peciallygreatforsmallwatersystems, whichaccountforadisproportionatelylargeshareof
SDWA violations (USEPA 1999). The 1996 amendments mandated direct methods of im-
proving compliance, including operator training and certiﬁcation. EPA was also required
to identify treatment technologies that are affordable for small water systems and grant
technology “variances” (waivers) when no such technology is available. However, these
variances are uncommon (Rubin 2001a). Additionally, the Drinking Water State Revolving
3Fund (DWSRF) was established to assist small systems. Departing from traditional regula-
tory approaches, DWSRF funds may be used for consolidation of water systems in addition
to funding infrastructure upgrades or sourcewater rehabilitation.
Indirect methods, such as system consolidation, may also help achieve higher compli-
ance rates. Through consolidation, small systems might achieve economies of scale and
improve their technical and ﬁnancial performance. While researchers have studied poten-
tial efﬁciency gains from consolidation (Shih et al.), we are not aware of any research that
has been examined the consolidation as a means to reduce the rate of SDWA violations.
Jaffe, Braden, and Lee review the economic and historical literature concerning mergers
and reorganizations in the water industry. Public health concerns, public ﬁnance pressures,
contractual conﬂicts, corruption, and transaction costs have all been theorized to provide
the impetus to merger. Previous research suggests that privately- and publicly-owned ﬁrms
mayhavedifferentmotivesregardingconsolidation. Inasetofcasestudiesofconsolidation
in the drinking water industry, Mann, Dreese, and Tucker found that high performing water
systemswerebeingacquiredbyprivately-ownedsystems, whilepoorlyperformingsystems
were being acquired by municipalities. This ﬁnding suggest that private water systems are
classical proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms while publicly-held water systems are partners of last
resort for struggling water systems.
Currently, many of the largest CWSs are located in urban areas and owned by the munici-
pal government. Federal and State governments also own and operate CWSs, such as those
associated with prisons, while Native American tribes commonly own their own CWSs.
All of these systems would be classiﬁed as publicly-owned 1. Very small water systems are
more likely than most to be privately-owned. Some of these systems serve a single residen-
tial complex and are often overseen by a homeowners association and have few, if any, full
time employees. They also commonly coexist with a nearby larger, more efﬁcient CWS.
1Many of the remaining large water systems are owned by large ﬁrms. These may be publicly traded ﬁrms
like Aqua American and Artesian Resources, or they may be privately held, like American Water. In
either case, these are classiﬁed as privately-owned.
4These small systems likely were built because developers found it less expensive to con-
struct a stand-alone water system than to connect to an existing system. Operators of these
systems may lack the expertise or infrastructure required to fully comply with the SDWA
and the ﬁnancial resources to expand their technical, managerial, and ﬁnancial capacity.
Many privately-owned water systems, larger ones in particular, are regulated by a com-
merce or utility commission. Averch and Johnson note that ﬁrms facing rate-of-return
regulation have an incentive to expand into new markets in order to raise their capital
base. While this may explain some horizontal merger activity, regulators typically set post-
merger water pricing very carefully in order to reduce this incentive. Regardless of the
motivation for acquisition, consolidation is likely to help small systems achieve economies
of scale. In this research, we focus on the ﬁrm’s decision to be acquired or continue inde-
pendent operations.
From an economic perspective, the production of drinking water is characterized by in-
creasing returns to scale, while transmission through the distribution network displays de-
creasing returns to scale (Clark and Stevie). Optimal economic water system size requires
a balance between the returns to scale in production and distribution. Large systems should
be located near major population centers and smaller systems will serve outlying subur-
ban and rural populations with smaller service regions. However, Rubin (2001b) ﬁnds that
many small water systems are actually located in urban or metropolitan regions and may
be located close enough to larger systems for consolidation to be feasible.
Small drinking water systems typically have relatively high costs of providing drinking
water; the average small system’s per-household infrastructure cost is three times larger
than those of large systems (USEPA 1999). A small customer base yielding minimal op-
erating revenues makes funding infrastructure improvements difﬁcult. These infrastructure
needs are large; a recent EPA study concluded that the entire drinking water industry faces
a $161B gap in anticipated operating expenses and a $101B gap in anticipated capital ex-
penses in the next 20 years (USEPA 2002). Small systems also have greater difﬁculty
5securing access to ﬁnancing, although this has been mitigated to an extent by the estab-
lishment of the DWSRF. The National Drinking Water Advisory Council (NDWAC) has
identiﬁed the lack of economies of scale for small CWSs as a factor contributing to un-
sustainability and encouraged state primacy agencies to use consolidation as a means to
achieve these economies of scale (USEPA 2000).
Research on institutions in the water industry has historically focused not on merger,
but on the relative efﬁciency of public and private ﬁrms (Feigenbaum and Teeples; Bhat-
tacharyya, Parker, and Rafﬁee). However, merger and consolidation has recently become
a research focus. Castillo et al. use GIS to analyze the feasibility of consolidation from
a cost-of-interconnection perspective by identifying small systems in close proximity to
larger systems. The costs of merger, either through physical interconnection or satellite
management, were low enough for merger to be feasible for a large fraction of small wa-
ter systems. However, Ottem, Jones, and Raucher ﬁnd that the distance between small
CWSs and a suitable merger partner ranged from approximately 5 miles for systems in
metropolitan areas to over 11 miles for systems in rural areas. This ﬁnding raises the pos-
sibility that systems in rural areas are simply too far apart for merger to be cost effective.
Raucher, Harrod, and Hagenstad note that while the potential beneﬁts of consolidation in-
clude cost savings and increased regulatory compliance, costs include the physical costs of
interconnection as well as a loss of local control. Shih et al. ﬁnd that consolidation of very
small water systems (< 500 people served) with larger systems would result in nationwide
efﬁciency savings of $417-794 million per year. To date, we are aware of no study that
examined actual mergers in order to determine if merger can be an effective compliance
strategy.
Behavioral and Econometric Model
We present a simple model of the decision of a drinking water system to exit the business
through merger. Because water systems are commonly owned by a municipal government,
6it may not be appropriate to assume proﬁt maximization as their objective. Economists
have long recognized that ﬁrms, regulated ones in particular, may not be maximizing proﬁt,
but rather revenues, expenses, or manager utility (Williamson; Edwards). Accordingly, we
assume that owners of a water system are utility maximizers, and the decision-making pro-
cess occurs in this framework. We maintain this basic economic assumption for the owners
of all ﬁrms, public or private. In this framework, CWS owners are similar to consumers
making decisions about purchases of durable goods and a Random Utility Model (RUM)
of choice readily follows.
Owners of a CWS will choose to be acquired if the utility from acquisition is higher than
that of continuing to operate independently. Mathematically, a CWS is acquired if:
UA ≥UNA,
Where the subscript A denotes an acquired system and the subscripts NA denotes a non-
acquired system. We make the standard assumption that utility can be decomposed into
observed and unknown (to the analyst) components:
VA+εA ≥VNA+εNA
Under the assumption that these error terms are independently and normally distributed,
the probability that a CWS is acquired can be written as:
P(ACQUIRED) = P[VA−VNA ≥ ε] = Φ(Xβ) (1)
where Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution (Greene). The variable ACQUIRED takes
on a value of 1 if the water system was acquired or 0 if it was not acquired.
Our behavioral model and previous research suggest several hypotheses about the sys-
tems most likely to be acquired. Systems that are too small to achieve economies of scale
are likely to be acquired for a variety of reasons. These systems may be prone to economic
losses and may be using merger to achieve economies of scale. Dewey notes that merger
7may be a means to transfer physical assets to a more successful ﬁrm. In this industry,
merger may also be a way for small ﬁrms to exit the industry in an orderly manner. Sys-
tems with poor SDWA compliance records are also likely to use merger. Merger may be an
effective way of attracting better management or upgrading some components of the water
supply infrastructure.
Systems with low physical and political costs of completing a merger are more likely to
be acquired. These costs should be especially small for CWSs that already purchase water
from, and have an established connection to, a nearby system. Similarly, systems that are
located closer to a potential partner presumably would incur lower costs of consolidation
and be more likely to merge. Rural systems are likely to be located farther from an existing
CWSs, reducing the potential for merger. However, these rural systems face lower unit
costs of interconnections with fewer buildings, houses, and roads that make pipeline instal-
lation expensive. The net effect of ruralness is ambiguous. Compared to privately-owned
CWSs, publicly-owned systems may confront a lengthy, expensive political process asso-
ciated with transferring publicly-owned assets, and therefore be less likely to be acquired.
These processes may also require hearings by the state commerce or utility commission,
especially when a publicly-owned CWS is acquired by a privately-owned company.
Data
We gathered data on mergers of CWSs from six state primacy agencies in EPA regions 5
and 7: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Missouri, and Nebraska. The primacy agencies
keep data on mergers for different lengths of time; for example, records of merger activity
in Illinois span 11 years, while records in Michigan cover only four years. We pool all
of the observations across states and years. This information is combined with system
characteristics data from EPA’s Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) and
county level demographic data from the US Census (Table 1). Mergers are rare events; only
8430 of the 6,502 water systems (6.61 percent) were acquired during the period covered by
our data.
Economiststypicallyuseﬁnancialratiosofproﬁtability, debt, orcashﬂowasexplanatory
variables to study mergers of publicly-traded ﬁrms (Palepu; Espahbodi and Espahbodi). As
a whole, these are thought to proxy of suitability for merger or relative strength of a ﬁrm.
These ratios are unavailable for the drinking water industry, but other measures of merger
suitability are available. The EPA’s SDWIS database contains information on community
water systems, including information on service connections, drinking water violations,
ownership, and water source. Service connections (SVC) are the number of distinct billable
connections that a water system serves. Systems with few service connections may be
less able to achieve economies of scale and, therefore, less likely to achieve the technical,
ﬁnancial, and managerial skills necessary to provide drinking water. We hypothesize that
these small systems are more likely to use merger to exit the drinking water industry.
While SDWIS reports SDWA violations in ﬁne detail, we have aggregated those viola-
tions into two categories: monitoring/reporting violations and quality violations. Moni-
toring and reporting violations (MONIT) include failure to adequately test drinking wa-
ter, ﬁle a consumer conﬁdence report, or notify the public of a drinking water quality
violation. This may be particularly indicative of managerial underperformance. Quality
violations (QUAL) include treatment-type violations and maximum contaminant level vi-
olations. They may reﬂect low technical capacity or infrastructure problems. The USEPA
reports the number of violations by a system per year, without reporting information on
the severity of the violations. In our analysis, we use the average number of violations
committed by a water system per year. We view both types of SDWA violations as gen-
erally indicative of low technical, ﬁnancial, and managerial capacity. We hypothesize that
CWSs with more violations of either type are more likely to be acquired than systems with
good compliance records. By allowing both types of violation to enter our econometric
model separately, we can test for the relative importance of their effect on the probabil-
9ity of merger. Prior to any merger activity, 62.1 percent of small drinking water systems
were publicly-owned, while the remaining 37.9 percent were privately-owned. We expect
that the political costs of merger are higher, and therefore the likelihood of merger is less,
for publicly-owned systems due to the political process required to transfer ownership of
publicly-owned assets. We hypothesize that publicly-owned CWSs are less likely to be
acquired.
Water systems that purchase water, and therefore have already connected to another sys-
tem, have lower transactions costs of completing a merger. Approximately 18 percent of
the water systems in our sample purchase water (PURCHASE) from another system. We
hypothesize that these systems are more likely to be acquired.
We construct two proxy variables to measure the costs of interconnection. Castillo et al.
used GIS to identify water systems in close proximity, they then used these distances to
calculate costs of interconnection based on per-mile infrastructure costs, allowing the per-
mile costs to vary between rural and urban areas. Unfortunately, detailed spatial data are
unavailable due to security concerns. We instead use the density of service connections
per square mile in each county (DENSITY) as a proxy for the cost of a system merger.
In densely-populated counties, the water supply network is more extensive, which would
presumably decrease the distances between systems, and therefore the transactions costs
of completing a merger. However, in those counties, the per-unit costs of constructing
pipelines may also be higher due to an increase in the density of obstacles posed by a more
urban environment.
The National Research Council maintains that small systems in rural areas face difﬁcult
demographic pressures, including decreasing populations, lower incomes, and higher rates
of poverty. Rural systems faced with resource limitations may use merger to comply with
SDWA regulations. However, as Rubin (2001b) and Ottem, Jones, and Raucher ﬁnd that
consolidation may be be unaffordable for small rural systems and overall use of merger
by small systems is unknown. In order to capture this effect, we include an indicator
10derived from the Economic Research Service’s Rural-Urban continuum. Although the ERS
categorizes counties on a nine-point scale, counties were aggregated into metropolitan and
non-metropolitan counties. The variable (METRO) takes on the value of 1 if the county
is a metropolitan county and 0 otherwise. The inclusion of this variable together with a
term interacting METRO with DENSITY introduces controls for the likely physical costs
of merger.
We use two county-level demographic variables from the 1990 US Census that were
identiﬁed by the NRC as affecting the viability of small water systems: median income
(CTYINC) and growth rate(CTYGRO). The latter variable is calculated as the percent in-
crease or decrease in population between 1990 and 2000. Systems in areas with low income
and negative growth rates face greater resource limitations and are more likely to be can-
didates for acquisition. Dummy variables are used to control for variations in state-level
policies as well as variations in the observation period.
Summary statistics along with hypothesis generated by our model are presented in Ta-
ble 2. A simple correlation matrix of the independent variables is presented in Table 3.
Some of the independent variables, particularly the county level demographic variables are
moderately collinear. There is also moderate correlation between PUBLIC and SVC; very
large water systems tend to be government-owned. Econometrically, this will reduce the
precision of the estimates and increase estimated standard errors.
The probit model estimation uses our full sample with the DENSITY and METRO vari-




+β13METRO×DENSITY2+β12INCOME +β13GROWTH +γ~ Z], (2)
11where ~ Z is a vector of dummy variables that are used to control for the state in which a
CWS is located. Because there is no underlying structural model of merger on which to
base the estimation, we estimate four alternative model speciﬁcations. These speciﬁcations
areformulatedbyadding, dropping, ortransformingvariablesinordertocapturenon-linear
effects of these variables on the probability of a system being acquired.
Results
Estimation results are presented in Table 4. The ﬁrst speciﬁcation includes squared terms
for SVC, DENSITY, QUAL, and MONIT to account for possible non-linear effects. The
second alternative omits those squared terms. The third alternative uses the natural loga-
rithm of SVC and DENSITY to account for possible nonlinear effects in those variables,
while maintaining the squared terms of QUAL and MONIT. The fourth alternative is nested
inside the third speciﬁcation and omits the squared terms for QUAL and MONIT. All spec-
iﬁcation include state dummy variables. While that group of variables is statistically sig-
niﬁcant, variation in state policies and the differing periods of observation complicate the
interpretation of those coefﬁcients. All reported signiﬁcance levels are constructed using
standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
The four models have similar goodness-of-ﬁt measures. Based on McFadden’s Likeli-
hood Ratio Index , models 3 and 4 are preferred. Model 4 is preferable using the Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC), classical hypothesis testing, and parsimony as model selection
guidelines. However, there is little theoretical guidance to choose between speciﬁcations.
In table 5, we present results of joint coefﬁcient tests for the 4 models. For models 1
and 3, we fail to reject the joint hypothesis that the QUAL2 and MONIT2 coefﬁcients are
both zero. However, many CWSs have no violations of either type, so these two variables
are highly correlated with the QUAL and MONIT variables. This results in large standard
errors and may cause the statistical insigniﬁcance.
12Despite the individual insigniﬁcance of the DENSITY2 and METROxDENSITY2
variables, they have joint explanatory power in model 1. We also ﬁnd that DENSITY,
DENSITY2, METROxDENSITY, and METROxDENSITY2 have joint explanatory power
in the same model.
Marginal effects for continuous variables are calculated by differentiating equation (1)







where φ is the normal probability distribution function. Following Train, we calculate
marginal effect though sample enumeration; equation (3) is then evaluated for all obser-
vations. Because the marginal effects are distributed non-normally, the medians of the
marginal effects are reported and signiﬁcance is determined directly from the population
conﬁdence intervals. For continuous variables, these can be interpreted as the change in the
probability of merger that results from a small change in the dependent variable. Marginal
effects for dummy variables cannot be calculated as above; instead discrete effects are cal-
culated from equation (1) as:
(4) Φ(XB)|xj=1−Φ(XB)|xj=0
Discrete effects are the change in probability of merger that results from a change in
value of the variable from 0 to 1. These values are also calculated using the sample enu-
meration procedure above. Marginal and discrete effects from our estimation are presented
in Table 6.
Interpretation
We focus on the results of our preferred speciﬁcation, model 4; however, the qualitative
results are robust across the speciﬁcations, with the exception of the QUAL, QUAL2,
MONIT, and MONIT2 coefﬁcients as discussed above. While the model should not be
13used to predict whether speciﬁc systems will be acquired, generalizations about the indus-
try can be made. The lack of an underlying theoretical model of merger dictates caution,
in the interpretation of the marginal effects. In general, the signs and signiﬁcance of the
coefﬁcients support many of our hypotheses.
The negative sign of the ln(SVC) coefﬁcient indicate that small systems are more likely
to be acquired than larger systems. All other things equal, a water systems with 100 addi-
tional service connections is 0.6 percent less likely to be acquired than a smaller one. This
supports our hypothesis that mergers are occurring in order to achieve economies of scale;
however, the relative size of this effect is small.
Monitoring and quality violations both increase the probability of merger, although the
effects of each type of violation are statistically different. A small water system with 1
monitoring violation per year is approximately 0.2 percent more likely to be acquired than
a system with no violations of this type. The effect is more pronounced for systems with
drinking water quality violations; a system with 1 quality violation per year is 1.4 percent
more likely to be acquired than a system with no quality violations. These results supports
our hypothesis that merger is being used as a compliance mechanism by water systems
with lower capability to provide safe drinking water. Both types of violations may indi-
cate poorly performing management; however drinking water quality violations seem to
provide a larger impetus for merger than monitoring violations. These systems may be
using merger to upgrade management capacity, technical capability, or both. It is impor-
tant to note that monitoring and quality violations are possibly endogenous to the model.
CWSs can be thought of as making capital expenditure decisions concurrently with de-
cisions about whether to be acquired. Rational owners that foresee or anticipate that their
CWS will be acquired will spend less on capital, possibly resulting in more frequent SDWA
violations. This effect may be mitigated to a certain extent by the averaging of SDWA vi-
olations across years; it is less likely that small CWSs are anticipating merger many years
14into the future. However, to the extent that this does occur, the coefﬁcients estimated are
biased upwards and should be interpreted cautiously.
Systems that already have interconnected infrastructure are able to complete a merger
at lower cost that systems that must pay for expensive infrastructure to ﬁnalize a merger.
Water systems that purchase water are 14.6 percent more likely to be acquired than systems
that had no preexisting connection to another system. The transactions costs of complet-
ing a merger are likely to be much lower when the two systems have already physically
connected and experienced working together. The merger and acquisition process can be
viewed as a continuum, with independent operation on one end and full integration on the
other. By outsourcing their production processes, while continuing to perform distribution
and administrative operations, water systems that purchase water are located in the middle
of this continuum. The choice to fully integrate with their water wholesaler is an obvious
next step. This result also suggests that encouraging water systems to purchase water may
eventually facilitate integration through merger.
Publicly-owned ﬁrms are less likely to be acquired, possibly due to the high political
costs involved with selling government assets.Our results imply that publicly-owned water
systems are approximately 6 percent less likely to be acquired than privately-owned water
systems. The costs of transferring ownership of public assets may be higher in terms of
political capital and bureaucratic costs, making mergers of municipal and government-
owned water systems less attractive. As Raucher, Harrod, and Hagenstad note, the loss of
local control over water supply is a very real cost of consolidation in this industry.
Rural systems are less likely to be acquired, which seems to support Rubin and Ottem,
Jones, and Raucher’s ﬁndings that rural systems are too dispersed for consolidation to be
cost effective. However, the discrete effect of METRO is not statistically different from
zero, suggesting that systems in rural areas are neither being acquired more or less fre-
quently than systems in more urban areas.
15The effect of service connection density on merger is small. The lnDENSITY coefﬁcient
is insigniﬁcant, which implies that density and distance are not important in explaining
merger in rural systems. However, the interaction term between METRO and lnDENSITY
reveals that , an increase in system density decreases merger probability for CWSs located
in metropolitan areas. An increase in the service connection density by 10 connections
per square mile increases the probability of merger by 0.2 percent in spite of increases in
merger costs due to location in a metropolitan area. However, this result is not robust across
speciﬁcations and should be treated with skepticism. Both the non-robustness and lack of
signiﬁcance may be due to the imprecision of these proxy variables. In particular, these
variables are aggregated at the county level; and take on the same values for all CWSs in a
county. Furthermore, they are proxy variables for costs, and may perform poorly.
Finally, systems located in counties with higher incomes are more likely to be acquired.
This implies that small systems in more resource-constrained areas are not using merger as
a mechanism to improve water quality, which is an unanticipated result. This variable also
is aggregated at the county level and may suffer from the previously described imprecision.
Conclusions
The problem of ensuring safe reliable public supplies of water in systems serving small
populations has received considerable regulatory attention in the past two decades. How-
ever, most of the focus has been on technical solutions. The question of organizational
change in response to increasingly demanding drinking water regulations has received min-
imal attention in the economic literature. Our results indicate some support for the theory
that merger and acquisition can improve the regulatory compliance of small water systems,
serving to upgrade services and improve system performance.
We ﬁnd that systems with frequent SDWA violations are more likely to be acquired.
This may indicate that small systems are using merger as a tool to improve performance.
However, even when controlling for their proximity to neighboring systems, small systems
16inareaswithslowpopulationgrowth(ordeclines)andlowerincomesarenotusingthistype
of institutional change as a compliance strategy. This result suggests that local ownership
may be relatively more important in the life of low-income and demographically stagnant
communities than is the case in more afﬂuent or populous areas. It may also suggest that
potential merger partners shy away from systems serving such communities.
According to the USEPA, large capital improvements to drinking water infrastructure
will be necessary in the coming years (USEPA 2002). Merger may be a cost-effective
means at upgrading the capital stock of the industry if acquired ﬁrms are using merger to
discontinue reliance on old, depreciated capital.
Quality and monitoring violations increase the probability of a merger by different
amounts, and the marginal effect of quality violations is approximately ﬁve times larger
than the effect for monitoring violations. This may reﬂect the relative costs of the two
different types of violations. It may also reﬂect the relative ease of ﬁxing monitoring
problems compared to the capital intensive requirements associated with the same water
quality compliance issues. The fact that smaller systems are more likely to merge is
consistent with motivations to realize economies of scale. Some small residential or
commercial systems may be divesting themselves of a non-core business enterprise.
We ﬁnd that systems with lower costs of completing a merger are more likely to be ac-
quired. Public ownership, and it bureaucratic and political costs, makes merger less likely,
while an existing physical connection makes merger more likely. Furthermore, CWSs lo-
cated in wealthier areas are more likely to use merger, perhaps because these systems have
the resources to pay for a merger. Decreasing those transactions costs or increasing the
ability of a small water system to pay for a merger could have the effect of encouraging
mergers. This could be accomplished directly through ﬁnancial transfers and low-cost ﬁ-
nancing of merger costs or indirectly through modifying existing regulations.
There has been substantial effort to increase the capacity of small water systems di-
rectly, through operator training, subsidized loans, and technology variances. Most of the
17gains from those activities may have been realized. Comparatively less effort has focused
on merger as an institutional change and there may still be sizable gains to be realized
from relatively small investments in merger-encouraging policies. Policies that lowering
the political, regulatory, and physical costs of mergers, may be an effective means to in-
crease SDWA compliance. In particular, allocating Drinking Water State Revolving Funds
(DWSRF) to ﬁnance mergers may be an effective use of funds. Additionally, purchasing
water seems to be an intermediate step in the consolidation process. Encouraging systems
to purchase water may be an effective policy if EPA cannot encourage consolidation more
directly.
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24Table 5. Coefﬁcient Tests for Probit Models









QUAL=MONIT 0.724 0.005 0.678 0.003
Note: All reported p-values are for χ2 tests with appropriate degrees of freedom.
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